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Abstract 
Few legal decisions have gained greater academic and public scrutiny than has the Google Spain case 
and the facts of this so-called ‘right to be forgotten’ case are widely known. 
As could be expected, the CJEU’s decision of 2014 is legally technical and addresses a range of 
topics. Here, I will focus on those aspects of the judgment, and its (suggested) implementation, that 
has to do with jurisdiction. Those matters must be viewed in their proper context. To that end, this 
article places the discussion in the context of: (1) the ongoing European data privacy reform, (2) the 
considerable development of data privacy laws around the globe and (3) the general trend of 
jurisdictional overreach. 
Having done so, a Model Code Determining the Geographical Scope of Delisting Under the Right To 
Be Forgotten is presented and discussed. 
Keywords 
Extraterritoriality - Right to be forgotten - Jurisdiction - Data Privacy - Google Spain. 
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1. Introduction 
The Internet is made up of both structured and unstructured data in a sense. However, as a whole the 
Internet is best viewed as being unstructured and data is largely inaccessible until it is searchable. 
The widespread availability of relatively accurate search engines means that the unstructured data 
that makes up the Internet becomes accessible in a manner it would otherwise not have been. And with 
this accessibility comes increased data privacy concerns. 
The important role played by search engines came under the proverbial microscope in a 2014 
decision by the Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU).
1
 Few legal decisions have gained 
greater academic and public scrutiny than has the Google Spain case and the facts of the case are 
widely known.
2
  
When Spanish citizen Mr Mario Costeja González, via a Google search, found links to two, for him 
unflattering, pages of the Spanish newspaper La Vanguardia from 1998, he requested that the 
newspaper remove the personal information about him contained in the relevant pages. He also 
requested that Google Spain and Google Inc remove or conceal the personal data relating to him so 
that the data no longer appeared in the search results and in the links to La Vanguardia. 
The matter ended up before the Spanish data protection authority Agencia Española de Protección 
de Datos (AEPD). The AEPD rejected the complaint against La Vanguardia. At the same time, it 
upheld the complaint against Google. 
Google brought the matter before the Spanish National High Court (Audiencia Nacional), and that 
court referred the matter to the CJEU. 
As could be expected, the CJEU’s decision is legally technical. Here, I will focus on those aspects 
of the judgment, and its (suggested) implementation, that has to do with jurisdiction.  
2. The relevant context 
The judgment in the Google Spain case, as well as its implications and the reactions it has received 
must be viewed in their proper context. Account must be had to at least the following aspects: (1) the 
ongoing European data privacy reform, (2) the considerable development of data privacy laws around 
the globe and (3) the general trend of jurisdictional overreach. 
2.1 The European data privacy reform
3
 
Having introduced its trailblazing data protection Directive in 1995, the EU is now looking to 
modernise its data privacy law through a Regulation that will harmonise the law across Europe. 
Several parts of the proposal have been controversial,
4
 and progress has been slow since the proposal 
was first released in January 2012. 
                                                     
1
 Google Spain SL, Google Inc. v Agencia Española de Protección de Datos, Mario Costeja González (Case C-131/12) 
2
 For a useful, although for obvious reasons incomplete, list of academic commentary of the Google Spain case, see: 
http://www.cambridge-code.org/googlespain.html. 
3
 This part is based on: http://theconversation.com/how-europes-data-privacy-reform-could-cost-australian-business-
24210. For an insightful analysis of the draft Regulation’s approach to the right to be forgotten, see: Giovanni Sartor, The 
right to be forgotten in the Draft Data Protection Regulation, International Data Privacy Law 5(1) (2015) pp. 64-72. 
4
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Arguably the most controversial aspect of the proposed Regulation is found in the delineation of 
the Regulation’s geographical scope of application. Yet, there has been surprisingly little attention 
given to this issue. 
While latter versions – of which there has been many – have overcome the problem, the initial 
2012 proposal was fatally flawed. It extended the Regulation in such a fashion that it would have 
given Europeans the right to rely on the Regulation even where they were physically present in non-
European countries – the law would have followed the person travelling the world.5 Thus, e.g. a 
European citizen entering into a contract in a shop in Sydney Australia would have been able to rely 
on the EU Regulation in relation to any data collected by the shop in Sydney. 
In a March 4 speech, European Commission Vice-President, Viviane Reding, stressed that the 
proposed Data Protection Regulation “is about creating a level playing-field between European and 
non-European businesses. About fair competition in a globalised world.”6 
This argument does not lack merit. However, the idea that the Regulation’s wide reach creates a 
“fair competition in a globalised world” is questionable. In fact, complying with the complex EU data 
privacy law is likely to be prohibitively expensive for small and medium sized non-EU businesses 
interacting on the European market on an irregular basis. The result will be that only large foreign 
businesses, and foreign businesses that do not care about complying with EU law, will be able to 
afford to enter the European market. 
Improved data privacy protection is to be welcomed, but the problem is one of nuance. The 
proposed EU data privacy Regulation contains many different types of rules. Some rules are aimed at 
preventing privacy abuse, and such rules are common in privacy laws around the world. There is, of 
course, nothing unreasonable about non-European companies wishing to benefit from the European 
market having to abide by EU law protecting against misuse of personal information. 
But other rules are administratively burdensome and require changes to business structures. For 
example, it seems absurd that a non-European organisation with some limited interaction with EU 
residents also has to implement potentially costly administrative measures such as appointing a Data 
Protection Officer. Such rules should only apply to businesses that have a substantial presence on the 
European market. 
The solution is obvious. The EU ought to adopt more sophisticated rules as to when the proposed 
regulation applies outside the EU so as to avoid this type of all-or-nothing situation. We need to see 
the EU distinguish between the types of data privacy rules it applies to everyone who deals with EU 
residents, and those rules that only apply to businesses substantially engaging on the European 
market.
7
 
In light of this type of extraordinary jurisdictional oversteps, it is not surprising that non-Europeans 
may approach European claims of extraterritoriality in the data privacy setting with a degree of 
suspicion. 
2.2 Data privacy law beyond Europe 
Greenleaf has carried out extensive research into data privacy laws around the globe. Through this 
research he has shown that by mid-2014, 103 States across the world had enacted national data privacy 
                                                     
5
 Dan Svantesson, Extraterritoriality of data privacy law (Ex Tuto, 2013), at 107-108. 
6
 http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_SPEECH-14-175_en.htm 
7
 Dan Svantesson, A “layered approach” to the extraterritoriality of data privacy laws, 3(4) INTERNATIONAL DATA 
PRIVACY LAW 278-286 (2013). 
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laws.
8
 No less than 50 of those States are non-European. Consequently, soon there will be more non-
European States with data protection laws than there are European States with such laws. And in light 
of this, Greenleaf is of course correct in pointing out that innovation in data privacy law is no longer 
just coming from Europe.
9
  
This is important to remember. Europe has and will have the most advanced data protection law in 
the world, but that does not mean that all aspects of foreign law are inferior or on a lower level than 
what we find in Europe. Thus, compliance with EU law does not guarantee compliance with all 
foreign laws. 
Europeans will have to take greater steps to familiarise themselves with data privacy developments 
outside of Europe. After all, European data privacy law is not alone in its approach to 
extraterritoriality. In fact, while exceptions can be found (e.g. current Japanese data privacy law), there 
is a tendency of data privacy laws around the world to adopt an extraterritorial scope so that European 
businesses doing business e.g. in Australia or Singapore will be bound to abide by Australian and 
Singaporean data privacy law.
10
 
In this context, it is also worth recalling that some non-European data privacy laws make possible 
the awarding of heavy penalties. For example, Trinidad and Tobago’s Data Protection Act 2011 
imposes fines up to 10% of the offending party’s annual turnover (s. 69).11 In light of this, the wisdom 
of justifying breaches of the law by reference to the obvious enforcement difficulties may be called 
into question. 
All this highlights that any approach to the right to be forgotten adopted by the European Union is 
likely to be mirrored in other States. It is therefore sensible to evaluate all matters not just from the 
perspective of how well they fit within the overall European data privacy system, but also from the 
perspective of how well they will suit Europe if adopted in other States’ data privacy laws. 
2.3 The general trend of jurisdictional overreach 
There is a general trend of jurisdictional overreach, and the CJEU’s decision in the Google Spain case 
forms part of, and contributes to, this trend. While examples of this trend abound, I will here restrict 
myself to two recent illustrative court decisions. 
2.3.1 The Garcia case
12
 
The legal drama
13
 that has followed in the wake of the online publication of the film titled ‘Innocence 
of Muslims’ may be worthy of being used as the plot for a movie in its own right. And, given a recent 
judgment by Chief Judge Kozinski in the US 9
th
 Circuit, it would no doubt be best set as a horror 
movie. 
                                                     
8
 Greenleaf, G 2014, ‘South Korea’s innovations in data privacy principles: Asian comparisons’, Computer Law & 
Security Review, vol. 30, pp. 492-505, at 493. 
9
 Greenleaf, G 2014, ‘South Korea’s innovations in data privacy principles: Asian comparisons’, Computer Law & 
Security Review, vol. 30, pp. 492-505, at 493. 
10
 Svantesson, D 2013, Extraterritoriality in Data Privacy Law, Ex Tuto Publishing, Copenhagen. 
11
 For more information about this Act, see: Edmund D Christo 2013, ‘Data Protection in Trinidad and Tobago’, 
International Data Privacy Law, vol. 3, no. 3, pp. 202-9. 
12
 This part is based on: http://blawblaw.se/2014/04/ignorance-or-arrogance-%e2%80%93-a-us-court-claims-the-right-to-
regulate-the-internet-world-wide/ 
13
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The background to the dispute is rather complex, but put simply, Cindy Lee Garcia was cast in a 
minor role in a film with the working title ‘Desert Warrior.’ For the three and a half days of filming 
she received $500. However, that film never materialised. Instead, Garcia’s scene was used in another 
film – a highly controversial film titled ‘Innocence of Muslims’.14 Garcia first saw this latter film after 
it was uploaded online. At that time, she discovered that her brief performance had been partially 
dubbed over so that she appeared to be making a statement offensive to persons of the Muslim faith. 
Garcia sought to have the movie taken down by arguing to have a copyrightable interest in her brief 
performance in the movie. Needless to say, such a claim has a slim prospect of success in most parts 
of the world, but Chief Judge Kozinski concluded that Garcia does have such a right.
15
 
Copyright lawyers will no doubt find the decision highly interesting merely by focusing on Chief 
Judge Kozinski contentious approach to the copyright issues involved. However, our interest in the 
case lies elsewhere. The concern in our context is that the Court ordered Google Inc to “take down all 
copies of ‘Innocence of Muslims’ from YouTube.com and from any other platforms under Google’s 
control, and take all reasonable steps to prevent further uploads of ‘Innocence of Muslims’ to those 
platforms.”16 (emphasis added) 
Given Google’s virtually global presence, with various country-specific platforms, the problem is 
obvious. US copyright law applies in the US, not globally. This fact can scarcely have escaped the 
Court. Yet, it was not even touched upon by the 9
th
 Circuit on this occasion. Indeed, Chief Judge 
Kozinski did not even seek to legitimise the approach by putting the court order in terms suggesting 
that the global take down was necessary to ensure the film was inaccessible in the US. 
2.3.2 The Google Canada case
17
 
In Equustek Solutions Inc. v. Jack,
18
 the Supreme Court of British Columbia granted an injunction 
requiring Google to block certain websites worldwide.  
Google argued that if the injunction was granted it should be limited to Google.ca, the website 
designated for Canada, for the reason that no court should make an order that has a reach that extends 
around the world; after all, what is illegal in state A may be perfectly legal, or even demanded by the 
law, in state B. However, the Court stated that: 
“[A]lthough Google has a website for each country to which searches made within that country 
default, users can override that default and access other country’s Google websites. For example, 
even if the defendants’ websites were blocked from searches conducted through www.google.ca, 
Canadian users can go to www.google.co.uk or www.google.fr and obtain results including the 
defendants’ websites. On the record before me it appears that to be effective, even within Canada, 
Google must block search results on all of its websites. Furthermore, the defendants’ sales 
originate primarily in other countries, so the Court’s process cannot be protected unless the 
injunction ensures that searchers from any jurisdiction do not find the defendants’ websites.”
19
 
(emphasis added) 
Given the availability of alternative search engines, this argument is difficult to maintain. The fact that 
one particular search engine blocks certain search results worldwide does not affect the availability of 
                                                     
14
 http://bits.blogs.nytimes.com/2014/02/26/federal-court-orders-youtube-to-take-down-controversial-anti-islam-video/ 
15
 http://cdn.ca9.uscourts.gov/datastore/general/2014/02/28/12-57302_opinion.pdf 
16
 https://www.techdirt.com/articles/20140226/12103626359/horrific-appeals-court-ruling-says-actress-has-copyright-
interest-innocence-muslims-orders-youtube-to-delete-every-copy.shtml 
17
 This part is based on: Svantesson, The Canadian ‘Google case’ – B.C. imperialism or a legitimate response to a difficult 
issue? LinkedIn (28 August 2014) 
18
 Equustek Solutions Inc. v. Jack (2014) BCSC 1063, http://www.courts.gov.bc.ca/jdb-txt/SC/14/10/2014BCSC1063.htm 
19
 Equustek Solutions Inc. v. Jack (2014) BCSC 1063, http://www.courts.gov.bc.ca/jdb-txt/SC/14/10/2014BCSC1063.htm 
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the content in question – the content is still there, it just cannot be found using that particular search 
engine. Consequently, the content can still be accessed through the use of an alternative search engine. 
But the Court, to its credit, had thought of this as well: 
“While there are other search engines, Google does not contest the plaintiffs’ assertion that 
Google’s position as the search engine used for 70-75% of internet searches means the defendants 
will not be commercially successful if they cannot be found through Google’s search services.”
20
 
With this in mind, the Court concluded that: 
“Google is an innocent bystander but it is unwittingly facilitating the defendants’ ongoing 
breaches of this Court’s orders. There is no other practical way for the defendants’ website sales to 
be stopped.”
21
 
The last sentence in this quote is, of course, incorrect. For example, sales require some form of 
payment method, so one other practical way for the defendants’ website sales to be stopped would be 
to seek to cut the payment mechanism. 
The bigger question is this: if the law fails to prevent certain Internet conduct, is it really reasonable 
that it places the burden of preventing that conduct on the shoulders of what it describes as ‘an 
innocent bystander’? 
The court order has been appealed and leave has been granted.
22
 
3. The jurisdictional issues of the Google Spain case 
There are two jurisdictional matters arising in, and from, the Google Spain case. Those matters will be 
discussed here.  
3.1 Jurisdiction over Google Inc? 
One of the first matters that needed to be considered in the Google Spain case was whether only 
Google’s Spanish subsidiary was caught by the Directive or whether also Google Inc in the US fell 
within the Directive’s scope of application. The problem was summarised by Advocate General 
Jääskinen in the following terms: 
“Google Inc. is a Californian firm with subsidiaries in various EU Member States. Its European 
operations are to a certain extent coordinated by its Irish subsidiary. It currently has data centres at 
least in Belgium and Finland. Information on the exact geographical location of the functions 
relating to its search engine is not made public. Google claims that no processing of personal data 
relating to its search engine takes place in Spain. Google Spain acts as commercial representative 
of Google for its advertising functions. In this capacity is has taken responsibility for the 
processing of personal data relating to its Spanish advertising customers. Google denies that its 
search engine performs any operations on the host servers of the source web pages, or that it 
collects information by means of cookies of non registered users of its search engine. 
In this factual context the wording of Article 4(1) of the Directive is not very helpful.”23 
There are numerous examples of globally active Internet intermediaries seeking to avoid the 
jurisdiction of courts by referring to the particular corporate structure they have adopted. For example, 
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 Equustek Solutions Inc. v. Jack (2014) BCSC 1063, http://www.courts.gov.bc.ca/jdb-txt/SC/14/10/2014BCSC1063.htm 
21
 Equustek Solutions Inc. v. Jack (2014) BCSC 1063, http://www.courts.gov.bc.ca/jdb-txt/SC/14/10/2014BCSC1063.htm 
22
 http://www.courts.gov.bc.ca/jdb-txt/CA/14/02/2014BCCA0295.htm 
23
 Opinion of Advocate General Jääskinen in Google Spain SL, Google Inc. v Agencia Española de Protección de Datos 
(AEPD) (Case C-131/12), paras 62-63. 
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in A v. Google New Zealand Ltd., Google New Zealand successfully argued that “the plaintiff has the 
wrong defendant, in that its ultimate parent company, Google Inc. (incorporated and resident in the 
United States of America), owns and operates the search engine.”24 This argument – which also was 
made in the Google Spain case – does not lack merits. After all, as noted by the Court, the fact that 
Google New Zealand Ltd. may be able to influence Google Inc. to act in a particular manner cannot be 
seen to make Google New Zealand Ltd. sufficiently connected to the publication as such. Otherwise, 
as pointed out by Google New Zealand Ltd., it may be subject to a court order (i.e. to remove the 
relevant search results) that it simply does not have the power to comply with. 
However, it may be that courts increasingly will view with suspicion this type of legal argument. In 
this context, the Court’s reaction is telling when Facebook, in a recent Brazilian case, sought to 
complicate the proceedings by arguing that Facebook Inc and Facebook Ireland Ltd., located in the 
United States and Ireland respectively, rather than Facebook Brazil, were the appropriate defendants. 
The Court expressed the view that (1) this argument was an “outrageous disregard” of Brazilian 
sovereignty, (2) Facebook is not a sovereign country superior to Brazil, and (3) if Facebook wants to 
operate in Brazil, it is subject to the Brazilian laws, regardless of where the parent companies are 
incorporated.
25
 
In my view, globally active Internet intermediaries – including search engines – need to abandon 
this type of short-term tactical, but strategically harmful, behaviour in order to maintain credibility; 
there is little to be gained by allowing globally active Internet intermediaries to rely on a particular 
corporate structure to make essentially domestic disputes take on a complicating international 
dimension. 
In addressing this complexity, Advocate General Jääskinen adopted what I elsewhere
26
 have termed 
a ‘consequence-focused approach’; that is, rather than restricting himself to a blind adherence to the 
exact wording of the Directive, he sought to identify the consequences of the various possible 
interpretations. Thus, he noted that on a literal interpretation of Article 4(1) of the Directive, Google 
has several establishments on EU territory and that this would exclude the applicability of the 
equipment condition laid down in Article 4(1)(c) of the Directive.
27
 Rather than just accepting this, 
Advocate General Jääskinen stated that, in his opinion “the Court should approach the question of 
territorial applicability from the perspective of the business model of internet search engine service 
providers.”28 Thus: 
“processing of personal data takes place within the context of a controller’s establishment if that 
establishment acts as the bridge for the referencing service to the advertising market of that 
Member State, even if the technical data processing operations are situated in other Member States 
or third countries.”
29
 
The CJEU took the following view: 
                                                     
24
 A v Google New Zealand Ltd [2012] NZHC 2352, at para 4. See also the Australian case: Duffy v Google INC & Anor 
[2011] SADC 178. 
25
 Giancarlo Frosio, A Brazilian Judge Orders Facebook off Air if It Fails to Remove a Defamatory Discussion,THE CENTER 
FOR INTERNET AND SOCIETY (October 7, 2013) http://cyberlaw.stanford.edu/blog/2013/10/brazilian-judge-orders-
facebook-air-if-it-fails-remove-defamatory-discussion.  
26
 Dan Svantesson, What is “Law”, if “the Law” is Not Something That “Is”? A Modest Contribution to a Major Question, 
26(3) Ratio Juris 456 (2013). 
27
 Opinion of Advocate General Jääskinen in Google Spain SL, Google Inc. v Agencia Española de Protección de Datos 
(AEPD) (Case C-131/12), para 63. 
28
 Opinion of Advocate General Jääskinen in Google Spain SL, Google Inc. v Agencia Española de Protección de Datos 
(AEPD) (Case C-131/12), para 64. 
29
 Opinion of Advocate General Jääskinen in Google Spain SL, Google Inc. v Agencia Española de Protección de Datos 
(AEPD) (Case C-131/12), para 67. 
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“In the light of that objective of Directive 95/46 and of the wording of Article 4(1)(a), it must be 
held that the processing of personal data for the purposes of the service of a search engine such as 
Google Search, which is operated by an undertaking that has its seat in a third State but has an 
establishment in a Member State, is carried out ‘in the context of the activities’ of that 
establishment if the latter is intended to promote and sell, in that Member State, advertising space 
offered by the search engine which serves to make the service offered by that engine profitable. 
In such circumstances, the activities of the operator of the search engine and those of its 
establishment situated in the Member State concerned are inextricably linked since the activities 
relating to the advertising space constitute the means of rendering the search engine at issue 
economically profitable and that engine is, at the same time, the means enabling those activities to 
be performed.”
30
 
This is all commendable and this reasoning has since been cited with approval in other parts of the 
world. For example, in the previously mentioned case of Equustek Solutions Inc. v. Jack,
31
 the 
Supreme Court of British Columbia specifically referred to the Google Spain case and concluded that 
“Google’s search and advertising services are inextricably linked.”32 
3.2 The geographical scope of the right to be forgotten 
Importantly, the CJEU was silent on the geographical scope of the right to be forgotten. Thus, 
different search engines may now be implementing the decision in different ways when it comes to 
this aspect. Google’s implementation has been described by its Global Privacy Counsel, Peter 
Fleischer: 
“We do not read the decision by the Court of Justice of the European Union (“CJEU”) in the case 
C-131/12 (the “Decision”) as global in reach—it was an application of European law that applies 
to services offered to Europeans. 
[...] 
It is our long-established practice to comply with national law by processing removals from search 
results for the version of search on the national ccTLD. We regularly remove results from country-
specific versions of search in this manner, typically based on notice through our user-facing 
webforms informing us of potential violations under national law. For example, users in Germany 
may alert us to pages featuring extremist content that violates German law, which we would 
remove from the google.de search results.  
In its decision, the CJEU presented a legal interpretation affecting multiple countries 
simultaneously. We heard some DPAs and others call for consistency across states in 
implementing it, and we have therefore decided to respect that effort by extending each removal to 
all EU/EFTA ccTLDs.”
33
  
However, the Article 29 Working Party’s Guidelines regarding the Google Spain decision emphasises 
that: 
“The ruling sets thus an obligation of results which affects the whole processing operation carried 
out by the search engine. The adequate implementation of the ruling must be made in such a way 
that data subjects are effectively protected against the impact of the universal dissemination and 
accessibility of personal information offered by search engines when searches are made on the 
basis of the name of individuals.  
                                                     
30
 Google Spain and Inc. v. Agencia Española de Protección de Datos (AEPD) and Mario Costeja González” - C-131/12, 
paras 55-56. 
31
 Equustek Solutions Inc. v. Jack (2014) BCSC 1063, http://www.courts.gov.bc.ca/jdb-txt/SC/14/10/2014BCSC1063.htm 
32
 Equustek Solutions Inc. v. Jack (2014) BCSC 1063, para 63. 
33
 Peter Fleischer, ‘Response to the Questionnaire addressed to Search Engines by the Article 29 Working Party regarding 
the implementation of the CJEU judgment on the “right to be forgotten”’, 31 July 2014, 
https://docs.google.com/file/d/0B8syaai6SSfiT0EwRUFyOENqR3M/view?pli=1&sle=true. 
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Although concrete solutions may vary depending on the internal organization and structure of 
search engines, de-listing decisions must be implemented in a way that guarantees the effective 
and complete protection of these rights and that EU law cannot be easily circumvented. In that 
sense, limiting de-listing to EU domains on the grounds that users tend to access search engines 
via their national domains cannot be considered a sufficient means to satisfactorily guarantee the 
rights of data subjects according to the judgment. In practice, this means that in any case de-listing 
should also be effective on all relevant domains, including .com.”
34
 
Thus, the message is clear; the Article 29 Group wants global blocking so as to ensure that EU law is 
not “circumvented”. The question is, of course, whether blocking on the .com domain will be enough 
to achieve this. Or does the Article 29 Group actually intend search engines to impose delisting also 
for non-European country domains?  
Perhaps the Article 29 Group’s wording gives us some hints. After all, it emphasises that: “In 
practice, this means that in any case de-listing should also be effective on all relevant domains, 
including .com.” (emphasis added) If the intention was that delisting should apply to all domains, 
there would be no need for the word “relevant”.35 This suggests that what the Article 29 Group has in 
mind is delisting on EU domains and on the .com domain. 
On the other hand, the very reasoning behind delisting on the global .com domain is that it is easy 
for people to use google.com to access content delisted on a country-specific search such as google.es 
– the Spanish domain. But, if content is delisted also on google.com, will not people who are 
sufficiently motivated to search for the content simply use another country-specific search such as 
google.com.au? After all, doing so requires little extra effort.  
Will this reasoning then mean that to comply with EU law, search engines need to delist search 
results all over the world, including on distinctly non-EU domains such as Australia’s .com.au?  
Given the Article 29 Group’s decision to issue Guidelines, it would have been useful if it would 
have engaged with this topic more thoroughly. 
4. Towards a better approach 
On 6 February 2015, the Advisory Council to Google on the Right to be Forgotten provided its 
Report.
36
 The Advisory Council that included eight invited independent experts, each with 
considerable experience and expertise, provided recommendations as to criteria for assessing delisting 
requests as well as input on a selection of procedural matters including the question of the 
geographical scope for delisting. Before dealing with that latter matter in further detail, some 
observations may appropriately be made more broadly about the principles presented in the Advisory 
Council’s Report. After all, the geographical scope for delisting must be viewed in the context of what 
principles guide the delisting decision as such. 
  
                                                     
34
 Article 29 Data Protection Working Party, ‘Guidelines on the implementation of the Court of Justice of the European 
Union judgment on “Google Spain and Inc. v. Agencia Española de Protección de Datos (AEPD) and Mario Costeja 
González” - C-131/12’ (2014) WP225, at 9. 
35
 While far-fetched, it is of course possible that the word “relevant” here is aimed to clarify that it is the domains belonging 
to a specific search engine that are referred to. However, that would be an unnecessarily cryptic way to express such 
delineation. 
36
 Advisory Council to Google on the Right to be Forgotten, Report of 6 February 2015. 
The Google Spain case: part of a harmful trend of jurisdictional overreach 
9 
4.1 The Advisory Council’s principles for delisting 
The criteria for assessing delisting requests focused on: 
1. The data subject’s role in public life; 
2. The nature of the information the request relates to, 
3. The source of the information as well as the motivation for publishing it; and 
4. The time that has lapsed between publishing and the delisting request. 
As far as the first of these topics is concerned, the Advisory Council devised a three-category structure 
in which individuals may be grouped; that is, (1) Individuals with clear roles in public life, (2) 
Individuals with no discernable role in public life and (3) Individuals with a limited or context-specific 
role in public life.
37
 Delisting request from individuals falling into the second category would 
obviously be more likely to result in delisting than requests by people falling into the first category. 
And delisting request from individuals within the third category would be most context sensitive.  
While it obviously is possible to envisage more complex categorisations, this aspect of the report 
ought to be relatively uncontroversial. 
Looking at the issue of what types of information normally would create a bias towards delisting, 
the Advisory Council listed the following seven categories:
38
 
1. Information related to an individual’s intimate or sex life; 
2. Personal financial information; 
3. Private contact or identification information; 
4. Information deemed sensitive under EU Data Protection law; 
5. Private information about minors; 
6. Information that is false, makes an inaccurate association or puts the data subject at risk of harm; 
and 
7. Information that may heighten the data subject’s privacy interests because it appears in image or 
video form. 
The Advisory Council also listed types of information that typically would be of public interest and 
therefore biased towards delisting request being denied:
39
 
1. Information relevant to political discourse, citizen engagement, or governance; 
2. Information relevant to religious or philosophical discourse; 
3. Information that relates to public health and consumer protection; 
4. Information related to criminal activity; 
5. Information that contributes to a debate on a matter of general interest; 
6. Information that is factual and true; 
7. Information integral to the historical record; and 
8. Information integral to scientific inquiry or artistic expression. 
Most of this ought to also be uncontroversial. However, it is of course always possible to think of 
additional types of information that could have been included in the lists. For example, focusing on the 
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list of types of information that normally would justify delisting, one may perhaps have expected to 
see reference to, for example, the following four types of information: 
1. Information that is defamatory; 
2. Information that amounts to a breach of confidentiality; 
3. Information that expresses a threat of physical harm to, or incites violence directed at, the person 
seeking delisting; and 
4. Information that amounts to bullying and harassment. 
Turning to the relevance of the source of the information as well as the motivation for publishing it, 
the Advisory Council expressed the view that: 
“Information that is published by or with the consent of the data subject himself or herself will 
weigh against delisting. This is especially true in cases where the data subject can remove the 
information with relative ease directly from the original source webpage, for example by deleting 
his or her own post on a social network.”
40
 (footnote omitted) 
On the topic of the possibility of seeking deletion of the original content, the Article 29 Group noted 
that: 
“Individuals are not obliged to contact the original site, either previously or simultaneously, in 
order to exercise their rights towards the search engines. There are two different processing 
operations, with differentiated legitimacy grounds and also with different impacts on the 
individual’s rights and interests.”
41
 
This is of course correct de lege lata. However, not least given the ongoing reform of EU data privacy 
law, we may benefit from pausing to consider this matter de lege ferenda. In my view, the matter of 
whether the data subject is in a position to have the original content removed or not should be given 
greater attention.  
If the data subject is in a position to have the original content removed, then we must question what 
is gained by allowing a delisting request aimed at the search engine instead. Indeed, one could go as 
far as to say that data subjects typically should seek the removal of the original content prior to 
lodging a delisting request with search engines. The very fact that there are multiple search engines 
makes the removal of the original content, where removal is justified, a more sensible and clearly 
more efficient option. 
In situations where the data subject is not in a position to have the original content removed, we 
should ask why that is so before we can make an assessment of how this position impacts the right to 
delisting.  
Where removal of the original content is prevented by law – i.e. where the holder of the original 
content can point to a legal reason why it does not have to remove the content, or indeed, a legal 
reason why it is not entitled to remove the content – the situation should prima facie also favour the 
denial of a delisting request (especially in the latter situation). However, where the removal of the 
original content is prevented by practical considerations such as the host being located overseas and 
refusing to cooperate, the data subject’s lacking ability to get the original content removed favours the 
delisting request being upheld. 
In discussing the impact of the time that has lapsed between publishing and the delisting request, 
the Advisory Council observed how: 
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“The ruling refers to the notion that information may at one point be relevant but, as circumstances 
change, the relevance of that information may fade. This criterion carries heavier weight if the data 
subject’s role in public life is limited or has changed, but time may be a relevant criterion even 
when a data subject’s role in public life has not changed. There are types of information for which 
the time criterion may not be relevant to a delisting decision—for example information relating to 
issues of profound public importance, such as crimes against humanity.  
This criterion will be particularly relevant for criminal issues. The severity of a crime and the time 
passed may together favor delisting, such as in the case of a minor crime committed many years in 
the past. It could also suggest an ongoing public interest in the information—for example if a data 
subject has committed fraud and may potentially be in new positions of trust, or if a data subject 
has committed a crime of sexual violence and could possibly seek a job as a teacher or a 
profession of public trust that involves entering private homes.”
42
 (footnotes omitted)  
Aspects of this deserve greater attention than is given in the Report and a revised set of 
recommendations could more directly address the fluid and changeable relevance of specific 
information. Content may be seen to be outdated and irrelevant on one date only to become highly 
relevant again at a later date. For example, information about a person’s criminal conduct may be seen 
to be outdated after a served jail term. But information about the initial crime may become relevant 
again at a later date if that criminal reoffends. In other words, the relevance of information is not static 
– it is constantly changing and is always dependent on context. 
The question is then who will seek to have the original content – content that has been delisted – 
re-listed where it regains currency? The criminal will of course not do so, and the search engines will 
not do so as they may not even be aware of the renewed relevance of the originally delisted search 
results. 
4.2 The Advisory Council’s approach to the geographical scope for delisting 
As noted above, the Article 29 Group’s Guidelines emphasise the need for an implementation that 
caters for effective and complete protection so that EU law cannot be easily circumvented. This, 
reasoned the Article 29 Group, requires de-listing on all relevant domains, including .com. Some 
problems with this have already been highlighted.  
The Advisory Council concluded that: “Given concerns of proportionality and practical 
effectiveness, [...] removal from nationally directed versions of Google’s search services within the 
EU is the appropriate means to implement the Ruling at this stage.”43 This approach – contrary as it is 
to the Article 29 Group’s Guidelines – was motivated by the following: 
 “There is a competing interest on the part of users outside of Europe to access information via a 
name-based search in accordance with the laws of their country, which may be in conflict with 
the delistings afforded by the Ruling.”44 
 “There is also a competing interest on the part of users within Europe to access versions of 
search other than their own.”45 
                                                     
42
 Advisory Council to Google on the Right to be Forgotten, Report of 6 February 2015, at 14. 
43
 Advisory Council to Google on the Right to be Forgotten, Report of 6 February 2015, at 20. One member of the Advisory 
Council – Sabine Leutheusser-Schnarrenberger – expressed a dissenting opinion on this matter: “According to my 
opinion the removal request comprises all domains, and must not be limited to EU-domains. This is the only way to 
implement the Court’s ruling , which implies a complete and effective protection of data subject’s rights. The internet is 
global, the protection of the user’s rights must also be global. Any circumvention of these rights must be prevented. Since 
EU residents are able to research globally the EU is authorized to decide that the search engine has to delete all the links 
globally.” (Advisory Council to Google on the Right to be Forgotten, Report of 6 February 2015, at 26-27). 
44
 Advisory Council to Google on the Right to be Forgotten, Report of 6 February 2015, at 19-20. 
45
 Advisory Council to Google on the Right to be Forgotten, Report of 6 February 2015, at 20. 
Dan Jerker B. Svantesson 
12 
 “It is also unclear whether such measures [technical measures to prevent Internet users in Europe 
from accessing search results that have been delisted under European law] would be 
meaningfully more effective than Google’s existing model, given the widespread availability of 
tools to circumvent such blocks.”46 
Further, the Advisory Council noted that: 
“The Council understands that it is a general practice that users in Europe, when typing in 
www.google.com to their browser, are automatically redirected to a local version of Google’s 
search engine. Google has told us that over 95% of all queries originating in Europe are on local 
versions of the search engine. Given this background, we believe that delistings applied to the 
European versions of search will, as a general rule, protect the rights of the data subject adequately 
in the current state of affairs and technology.”
47
 
A central question is then the extent to which delisting will affect this statistics. On this point, we can 
usefully connect to two other matters discussed in the Advisory Council’s Report; that is, (1) 
transparency, and (2) whether or not those whose content gets delisted ought to be informed. 
As to the relevant transparency issues, the Advisory Council noted that: 
“The issue of transparency concerns four related but distinguished aspects: (1) transparency 
toward the public about the completeness of a name search; (2) transparency toward the public 
about individual decisions; (3) transparency toward the public about anonymised statistics and 
general policy of the search engine; and (4) transparency toward a data subject about reasons for 
denying his or her request.”
48
 
The interesting part in our context here are points 1 and 2 on which the Advisory Council noted the 
following: 
“With regard to (1) and (2), in general it is our view that the decision to provide notice to users 
that search results may have been subject to a delisting is ultimately for the search engine to make, 
as long as data subjects’ rights are not compromised. In other words, notice should generally not 
reveal the fact that a particular data subject has requested a delisting.”
49
 (footnote omitted) 
In the context of whether or not those whose content gets delisted ought to be informed, the Advisory 
Council noted that: 
“In our public consultations, representatives from the media expressed concerns that delisting 
decisions could severely impact their rights and interests. To mitigate these potential harms, the 
aforementioned representatives suggested that they should receive notice of any delistings applied 
to information they had published. 
However, some experts argued that notifying webmasters may adversely impact the data subject’s 
privacy rights if the webmaster is able to discern either from the notice itself or indirectly who the 
requesting data subject is. 
The Council also received conflicting input about the legal basis for such notice. Given the valid 
concerns raised by online publishers, we advise that, as a good practice, the search engine should 
notify the publishers to the extent allowed by law.”
50
 (footnotes omitted) 
All of this is, of course, highly relevant for the likelihood that people will start using the .com domain, 
or indeed country domains of non-European States, to access content they expect is delisted in the 
                                                     
46
 Advisory Council to Google on the Right to be Forgotten, Report of 6 February 2015, at 20. See further: Dan Svantesson, 
Delineating the Reach of Internet Intermediaries’ Content Blocking – ‘ccTLD Blocking’, ‘Strict Geo-location Blocking’, 
or a ‘Country Lens Approach’?, SCRIPT-ed 11(2) (2014) pp. 153-170. 
47
 Advisory Council to Google on the Right to be Forgotten, Report of 6 February 2015, at 19. 
48
 Advisory Council to Google on the Right to be Forgotten, Report of 6 February 2015, at 21. 
49
 Advisory Council to Google on the Right to be Forgotten, Report of 6 February 2015, at 21. 
50
 Advisory Council to Google on the Right to be Forgotten, Report of 6 February 2015, at 17. 
The Google Spain case: part of a harmful trend of jurisdictional overreach 
13 
European search results. Consequently, great care must be taken when it comes to how search engines 
provide transparency and the extent to which those whose content gets delisted are informed.  
The potential for change in user patterns also highlights the wisdom of the Advisory Council 
limiting its statement as to the geographical scope to “the current state of affairs and technology” ”at 
this stage”. 
Finally,it is possible to read the Advisory Council’s call for delisting to be limited to the European 
domains as merely expressing a general rule. Indeed this message is made explicit in the second of the 
five paragraphs dealing with the geographical scope in the Advisory Council’s Report: 
”Given this background, we believe that delistings applied to the European versions of search will, 
as a general rule, protect the rights of the data subject adequately in the current state of affairs and 
technology.”
51
 (emphasis added) 
However, when the reader reaches the fifth and final paragraph relating to the issue of the 
geographical scope, that messages has been dropped: 
“Given concerns of proportionality and practical effectiveness, [...] removal from nationally 
directed versions of Google’s search services within the EU is the appropriate means to implement 
the Ruling at this stage.”
52
 
This creates an unnecessary ambiguity since many readers presumably will read the last paragraph – 
the paragraph that follows from the full discussion of the matter – as the Advisory Council’s final 
conclusion on the matter, and thereby will overlook the important caveat included in the second 
paragraph. 
4.3 The necessity of a consequence-focused approach also in this context 
Like both he and the Court had done in relation to the scope of Article 4(1) of the Directive (see 
above), Advocate General Jääskinen adopted the consequence-focused approach more generally in his 
approach to the case: 
“In the current setting, the broad definitions of personal data, processing of personal data and 
controller are likely to cover an unprecedently wide range of new factual situations due to 
technological development. This is so because many, if not most, websites and files that are 
accessible through them include personal data, such as names of living natural persons. This 
obliges the Court to apply a rule of reason, in other words, the principle of proportionality, in 
interpreting the scope of the Directive in order to avoid unreasonable and excessive legal 
consequences. This moderate approach was applied by the Court already in Lindqvist, where it 
rejected an interpretation which could have lead to an unreasonably wide scope of application of 
Article 25 of the Directive on transfer of personal data to third countries in the context of the 
internet.  
Hence, in the present case it will be necessary to strike a correct, reasonable and proportionate balance 
between the protection of personal data, the coherent interpretation of the objectives of the information 
society and legitimate interests of economic operators and internet users at large.”53 (footnote omitted) 
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The importance of this observation cannot be emphasised enough. The reality is that the legal 
framework we are working with here is structured in such a manner that its application to some forms 
of Internet activities can only be either sensible or coherent – it just cannot be both. In such a 
situation, people’s underlying articulated or unarticulated jurisprudential leanings will be 
determinative. Thus, my tendency to agree with the approach articulated by Advocate General 
Jääskinen on this topic admittedly stems from my particular view of what “law” is.54  
At any rate, those, like the Article 29 Group, who attempt to impose global blocking based on local 
European values cannot be viewed in isolation. As was made clear by reference to the US Garcia case, 
and the Google Canada case, they have their counterparts in other States. 
Furthermore, their attitude may be seen as natural and may even be viewed as necessary by some; 
after all, the most effective way to ensure that content cannot be accessed is through global blocking. 
But the problems caused by this attitude abound. 
Most importantly, if our standard position is global blocking based on our local laws, we can 
hardly object to other States doing the same. So when repressive dictatorships seek global removal of 
content offensive to their laws, supporters of the Garcia case, the Google Canada case and the Article 
29 Group’s Guidelines can hardly protest based on the effect such removal may have in open tolerant 
and democratic States.
55
 
The reality is that the trend of courts demanding global blocking based on local laws will inevitably 
lead to the destruction of a common resource – the Internet as we know it. And no matter what the 
European Commission is trying to tell us, this is not a myth.
56
 After all, what would be left online if 
anything that may be unlawful somewhere in the world was removed globally? 
Addressing this trend may be both the biggest, and the most important, challenge for Internet 
regulation today. And the solution we adopt must fit all legal systems, not just trusted European legal 
systems. 
Given the above, I maintain the position I expressed elsewhere
57
 that violations of local laws 
cannot as default be met by global blocking. This is of particular importance given that not only EU 
citizens may seek to rely on the Google Spain judgment to have content delisted. Consider, for 
example, the following insightful example provided by Kuner: 
“For example, it seems that under the judgment there would be no reason why a Chinese citizen in 
China who uses a US-based Internet search engine with a subsidiary in the EU could not assert the 
right affirmed in the judgment against the EU subsidiary with regard to results generated by the 
search engine. Since only the US entity running the search engine would have the power to amend 
the search results, in effect the Chinese individual would be using EU data protection law as a 
vehicle to bring a claim against the US entity. The judgment therefore potentially applies EU data 
protection law to the entire Internet, a situation that was not foreseen when the Directive was 
enacted. This could lead to forum shopping and 'right to suppression tourism' by individuals with 
no connection to the EU other than the fact that they use Internet services that are also accessible 
there. Even if the judgment is likely to be interpreted in practice more restrictively than this, such 
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broad application cannot be excluded based on the wording of the judgment.”
58
 (footnotes 
omitted) 
In the end, we must also link the discussion about the geographical scope for delisting to the more 
general discussion of what a right to be forgotten actually ought to achieve. A full discussion of that 
latter topic is beyond the scope of this paper. However, on the most fundamental level it is my 
impression that the right to be forgotten, at least as articulated in the Google Spain case, aims at what 
we can call a ‘first impression protection’ rather than a more absolute protection. After all, an absolute 
protection cannot be achieved where the original content remains online accessible for anyone who 
knows enough about the content to formulate a successful search string that does not include the 
object’s personal name, or indeed anyone who happens to come across the content when browsing the 
Internet.  
And if the right as such is not absolute, why should the implementation of the judgment be absolute 
in a geographical sense? Given the undisputed fact that an overwhelming majority of people use their 
local search engine version, it seems a ‘first impression protection’ may be achieved by delisting 
limited to EU domains. And if anything beyond that is desired, it is, as highlighted above, not enough 
to extend the delisting to the .com domain. Rather, should the implementation of the judgment be 
absolute in a geographical sense, it must extend to all domains, of all search engines, including the 
country domains of non-European states. This latter option comes with obvious and severe 
consequences.
59
 
4.4 Seeing the nuances in a complex grey zone 
Elsewhere
60
 I have acknowledged that, while global blocking based on the violation of local laws 
should not be the general default position, global blocking may well be justified in some instances. 
Thus, the question of the appropriate geographical scope of delisting under the right to be forgotten 
need not be the same for all requests for delisting. For some request, the delisting ought to be local, in 
other the delisting could go beyond local covering several States, or even be global. Consequently, we 
need a more nuanced approach than those articulated by the Article 29 Group, Google and the 
Advisory Council – as astutely noted by Powles “If delisting is determined on a case-by-case basis, 
surely the remedy can be too.”61  
In September 2014, I articulated the following four principles that could guide us in deciding 
whether or not to block Internet content on a global scale based on local laws: 
Principle 1: The extent to which a court order in one country should force the blocking/removal of 
content beyond that country must depend on the type of legal action that produced the relevant 
court order. 
Principle 2: Generally, orders requiring global blocking/removal should only be awarded against 
the party who provided the content, not parties that merely act as intermediaries in relation to that 
content. And such orders should only be awarded by the courts at the defendant’s place of 
domicile. 
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Principle 3: Exceptions to Principle 2 should be made in relation to particularly serious content 
such as child pornography materials.  
Principle 4: In relation to rights limited to the territory of a specific country, whether based on 
registration or not, courts should not order blocking/removal beyond that country.
62
 
By referring to child pornography materials as an example of “particularly serious content”, I do not 
mean to suggest that only materials as grave as that can justify global blocking, or delisting as in the 
case of the current context. Also other types of material may indeed justify a global blocking; one such 
example being so-called revenge porn.  
At least when it comes to major Internet companies, I suspect we are starting to see a trend of 
stronger, or at least clearer, corporate social responsibility in relation to what content is blocked. 
Focusing on revenge porn, for example, Twitter now makes clear that: “You may not post intimate 
photos or videos that were taken or distributed without the subject’s consent.”63 And on March 16, 
2015, Facebook announced new “Community Standards” to govern the conduct of its 1.39 billion 
users. Also this policy specifically addresses revenge porn: 
“To protect victims and survivors, we also remove photographs or videos depicting incidents of 
sexual violence and images shared in revenge or without permissions from the people in the 
images. 
Our definition of sexual exploitation includes solicitation of sexual material, any sexual content 
involving minors, threats to share intimate images, and offers of sexual services. Where 
appropriate, we refer this content to law enforcement.”
64
 
This is an important step, and follows a recent announcement by social media site Reddit that 
it has banned non-consensual nude photos shared on its site.65 
In assessing the true value of these initiatives, we end up in the now classic topic of self-regulations 
vs. legal regulation. In this context we can usefully pause to consider how a member of the Advisory 
Council – Frank La Rue – in his dissenting opinion expressed the following: 
“I must remind that the protection of Human Rights is a responsibility of the State, and in the cases 
where there can be limitations to the exercise of a right to prevent harm or violation of other rights 
or a superior common interest of society, it is the State that must make the decision. Therefore I 
believe it should be a State authority that establishes the criteria and procedures for protection of 
privacy and data and not simply transferred to a private commercial entity.”
66
 
This is an important point. Private companies operating search engines are unsuitable, and often 
unwilling, filters for what is ‘good taste’ for the Internet. Perhaps the better approach would be for a 
specific governmental department to receive and evaluate delisting requests and then notify the search 
engines of their decisions. Such a model would also have the advantage of avoiding complainants 
having to turn to multiple search engines in relation to the same content. 
In any case, in a highly interesting paper dealing specifically with the extraterritorial reach of the 
right to be forgotten, Van Alsenoy and Koekkoek have proposed “four factors to determine whether a 
State can ‘reasonably’ demand global implementation”67:  
1. How would global delisting impact the interests of residents of other states? 
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2. What is the likelihood of adverse impact if delisting is confined to local search results? 
3. To what extent is the norm to be enforced harmonised across other States? 
4. What factors create a territorial nexi to the forum State?68 
These factors are helpful indeed, but like the four principles I had advocated they could perhaps be 
complimented by a clearer focus on the types of content is in question. And here we can usefully 
reconnect with the useful recommendations made by the Advisory Council. 
Further, it is also necessary to flesh out the issue of what types of connections are required to create 
a sufficient nexi to the forum State. In contrast to Van Alsenoy and Koekkoek, I prefer to stay clear of 
a focus on territory in this context. For reasons I have outlined elsewhere,
69
 I advocate a departure 
from our traditional focus on the territoriality principle in favour of, what I see as a more 
contemporary approach, focused on “substantial connections” and “legitimate interests”.  
Combining all this then, the following model could be advanced: 
Model Code Determining the Geographical Scope of Delisting Under the Right To Be 
Forgotten  
Article 1 – General provision 
Where a request for delisting has been approved, its implementation should, apart from what 
appears in Articles 2-4, be limited to EU domains. 
Article 2 – Harmonised laws 
Where a delisting request has been approved for the EU domains, and the request includes 
evidence that delisting could be ordered under the laws of a non-EU State in relation to that State’s 
domain, the delisting should be extended to such a domain. 
Article 3 – Particularly serious content 
Where a delisting request has been approved for the EU domains and the request relates to 
particularly serious content, the delisting should be extended globally.
70
 
What amounts to “particularly serious content” is context-specific and no exhaustive general list 
can be devised. However, the following categories are examples of types of content that typically 
may justify delisting with global effect: 
a) Sexual content involving minors; 
b) Non-consensually disclosed sexual content (revenge porn); 
c) Content that is clearly defamatory, having regard to all relevant considerations including 
the person’s position in society; 
d) Content that expresses a threat of physical harm to, or incites violence directed at, the 
person seeking delisting; and 
e) Confidential details the disclosure of which exposes the person seeking delisting to a 
serious risk of fraud or theft.  
Article 4 – Other situations justifying delisting beyond the EU domains 
Where a delisting request has been approved for the EU domains, and: 
a) it has a substantial connection to at least one member state of the EU; 
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b) there is a legitimate interest in applying that member state’s law to the request; 
c) delisting on non-EU domains is unlikely to impacts the interests of residents of those 
other states; 
d) there is a high likelihood of adverse impact if delisting is confined to local search results, 
for example due to the content being such that persons are likely to seek it out via non-EU 
domains; and 
e) it is shown that attempts at having the original content removed or blocked either have 
failed, or are highly likely to fail, due to lacking cooperation from the content host,   
delisting should be extended beyond the EU domains, potentially globally, as appropriate. 
In assessing whether a delisting request has a substantial connection to a member state of the EU, 
regard shall be had to factors such as: 
a) The nationality, habitual residence and centre of interest of the requesting party; 
b) The nationality, habitual residence and centre of interest of the publisher of the original 
content; and 
c) The geographical scope of interest of the content. 
The same factors should form part of the assessment of whether delisting going beyond the EU 
domains impacts the interests of residents of other states.  
Article 1 should require little explanation. It sets down the general rules that delisting should be 
limited to the EU domains apart from where the issue at hand can be fitted into one of the exceptions 
outlined in Articles 2-4. The only thing to note here is that, should the model be framed in more 
general terms so that it can be applied also outside of the EU, we would obviously need to remove the 
reference to the ”EU domains” and instead refer to e.g. ”the local domain”. 
The aim of Article 2 is to create a one-stop shop allowing data subjects to request delisting across 
all domains governed by the same, or sufficiently similar, laws. This would of course improve 
efficiency both for the data subject and the search engines in minimising overlapping requests. And 
indeed, Google’s decision to extend delisting to all EU domains can be viewed as an example of this 
principle already being applied. 
Admittedly, there may, however, well be instances where it is difficult to assess whether the 
relevant laws are similar enough to justify the application of Article 2. With that potential fir 
complications in mind, it may be that Article two requires some fine-tuning, or that it indeed should be 
left out of the Model Code. 
As is made explicit in Article 3, the complex part of its application relates to how we should define 
what amounts to ”particularly serious content”. The Article does canvass some examples, but more 
generally, one matter that will be helpful in determining whether certain content fits into the category 
of “particularly serious content” or not, is whether the nature of the content is such that a reasonable 
person would legitimately be concerned or offended about a random third person viewing that content. 
For example, the availability of the sort of financial information at issue in the Google Spain case may 
only legitimately trouble a reasonable person where it is accessed by, either a person who knows the 
data subject or may enter into dealings or contact with the data subject. In contrast, a reasonable 
person may legitimately feel uncomfortable about revenge porn content depicting the sexual activities 
of the data subject even where that content is accessed by a random third person. Similarly, the 
potential harm that may stem from confidential details that exposes the data subject to a serious risk of 
fraud or theft may, of course, be a legitemate concern also where that content is accessed by a random 
third person. 
This test may also be particularly effective in assessing whether specific defamatory content is so 
serious as to fall into the category of ”particularly serious content”; after all, some types of defamatory 
content is only of concern where it is accessed by a third person with a connection to the data subject. 
Other type of defamatory content – such as an untrue claim that a particular person is a convicted war 
The Google Spain case: part of a harmful trend of jurisdictional overreach 
19 
criminal – may legitimately be a concern even where it is only accessed by random third persons. 
Finally as to Article 3, it may be that instead of only referring to global delisting, the Article should 
refer to delisting as widely as is appropriate in the circumstances. 
Article 4 attempts to capture all other situations in which it may be legitimate to extend delisting 
beyond the local domain(s). In trying to strike an appropriate balance that usefully can be applied 
across a diverse range of fact scenarios, it is unavoidably the most complex Article in the Model Code. 
Rather than focusing on territorial connecting factors, Article four focuses on whether there is a 
substantial connection and a legitemate interest. And indeed, also the Article 29 Group acknowledges 
that, on a practical level, the European interest is limited to data subjects with a strong connection to 
Europe:  
“Article 8 of the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights, to which the ruling explicitly refers in a 
number of paragraphs, recognizes the right to data protection to “everyone”. In practice, DPAs 
will focus on claims where there is a clear link between the data subject and the EU, for instance 
where the data subject is a citizen or resident of an EU Member State.”
71
 
Article 4 then draws, and expands, upon some principles articulated by Van Alsenoy and Koekkoek 
and also adds a requirement relating to the potential removal of the original content. This last 
requirement seems justified given the discussion above of the relevance of the original content. 
5. Concluding remarks72 
It is both amazing and amusing how a well chosen expression may capture our imagination. ‘Cloud 
computing’, ‘big data’ and the ‘right to be forgotten’ are all examples of phenomena that existed prior 
to, but came to life through, the catchy labels we attached to them. Am I the only one worried by this? 
Is there not something odd about the idea that the focus of legal, and other, researchers is so strongly 
guided by something as flimsy as catchy labels? 
The ‘right to be forgotten’ has attracted considerable attention for some years now both in legal 
circles and in media. And as is well-known, much, perhaps too much, of the focus of the undergoing 
reform work of the EU data privacy framework has been devoted to this right. 
The relevant legal landscape in Europe has been largely unaltered since the Data Protection 
Directive (Directive 95/46
73
) was introduced in the mid-90s. So the thought that the current debate 
influenced the CJEU’s willingness to embrace a right to be forgotten in Google Spain SL (Case C-
131/12) is difficult to escape. 
At any rate, even if the Court spoke expressly about a right to be forgotten, it seems to me that, that 
was not what was delivered in the judgment. The court order is not focused on any such right. If it 
was, it would have required the original publisher (La Vanguardia) to remove the content as well, but 
it did not. 
The real effect of the judgment is to impose a ‘duty to be forgetful’ onto certain Internet actors – in 
this case search engines, or indeed, one particular search engine. 
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So does this matter? I think it does. First of all, politically, it is of course always easier to ‘sell’ a 
right than it is to sell a duty. And second, as was referred to more generally above, the labels guide, or 
even control, our thinking to a large extent. 
In the text above, I have sought to draw attention to the jurisdictional issues that arose in, and stem 
from, the Google Spain decision. More specifically, I first addressed the question of whether the 
Directive applies to the conduct of Google Inc based in the US. It was shown that both the Advocate 
General and the Court sensibly adopted what we can call a consequence-focused approach in 
disposing of this issue. 
The second jurisdictional issue – that of the geographical scope of the right to be forgotten – 
needed to be dealt with in more detail. After all, this matter goes more directly to the future 
implications of the judgment. And just how controversial this issue is can be seen with great clarity in 
the fact that while the Article 29 Group’s Guidelines on the implementation of the judgment 
specifically calls for delisting to go beyond the EU domains, recommendations of the Advisory 
Council to Google on the Right to be Forgotten specifically calls for delistings to be limited to the EU 
domains, at least at this stage.  
I asserted that the question of the geographical reach of the right to be forgotten is context specific 
and that the solution consequently needs to be more nuanced than these two extremes – and also here 
should we adopt a consequence-focused approach. 
To that end, I proposed a Model Code Determining the Geographical Scope of Delisting Under the 
Right To Be Forgotten. The Model Code draws upon my earlier research on blocking issues, the 
findings made in this paper, some of the classifications made in the Advisory Council’s report and the 
four factors to determine whether a State can ‘reasonably’ demand global implementation presented 
by Van Alsenoy and Koekkoek. 
There can be no doubt that the road ahead for the right to be forgotten – or rather the duty to be 
forgetful – is going to be long and continue to be controversial. However, given the attention it has 
generated, it represents a good test case for ironing out some of the jurisdictional issues that have 
plagued the Internet since it started crossing borders. Thus, there is every reason to continue the 
interesting debate that the controversial Google Spain case has generated to date.  
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